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PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF ATTORNEYFEES
AND COSTS IN MASS TORT LITIGATION-
A RESPONSE TO JUDITH RESNIK
NANCYJ. MOORt'
Professor Resnik begins her paper, Money Matters: Judicial Markei
Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual
and Aggregate Litigation, by noting what she regards as the obvious in-
sufficiency of current law regarding the payment of attorney fees and
costs in mass tort lawsuits.! According to Professor Resnik, there is a
"shared sense that 'something' needs to be done,"2 but there is no
consensus on what that "something" is.3 Professor Resnik's solution
appears to be increased regulation by judges,4 including heightened
attention to the relationships among differently situated lawyers; for
example, lawyers who are class counsel or members of a plaintiffs'
steering committee and lawyers who represent individual clients.5
t Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law-, BA 1970, Smith College;J.D.
1973, Columbia University. This paper was prepared forMass Torts: A Symposium spon-
sored by the David Berger Program on Complex Litigation and the University of Pennsylvania
Law School in conjunction with the Advisory Committee of Civil Rules of theJudicial Conference
of the United States, November 11-12, 1999. My thanks to Professor Stephen Burbank for
organizing the symposium and inviting me to participate and to ProfessorJudith Res-
nik for providing the fascinating and provocative article to which I was asked to re-
spond.
'Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119,
2120 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Money Matters] ("I have no need to rehearse the ar-
guments about the different methods used for paying lawyers or the insufficiency of
current law.").
2da
8 Cf. id. ("But I do need to explain why figuring out what to do is difficult.").4 Professor Resnik suggests a range of increased regulatory activity on the part of
judges overseeing mass tort class action lawsuits and multidistrict litigation ("MDL").
See, e.g., id. at 2170 ("Judges must seek out other participants in order to discharge ju-
dicial obligations to test (if not ensure) the adequacy of representation."); id. at 2162-
63 ("Judges, now required to regulate advocacy by lawyers, will have to refashion the
incentives of lawyers to ensure that subclasses of varying economic values all receive
quality representation."); id. at 2171 ("Judicial regulation of contractual fee agree-
ments in tort litigation has already begun to increase." (footnote omitted)); id. at 2181
(recommending "U]udicial oversight of negotiations").
5 See e.g., id. at 2187 (suggesting thatjudges will have to learn about economic rela-
tionships among the lawyers in a mass tort lawsuit in order to monitor the quality of
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I teach and write in the area of lawyer ethics, not civil procedure or
mass torts. As an ethicist who is not as familiar as others with what is
happening in the world of mass torts, I hope I will be forgiven if I have
not fully understood the nature and extent of the problem that Pro-
6
fessor Resnik is attempting to solve. I have been much informed by
Professor Resnik's paper, as well as by her earlier work, including sev-
eral collaborative efforts that describe, in rich detail, what she refers
to as the elaborate "layers of lawyers" who perform various roles in
these lawsuits.
7
In Money Matters, Professor Resnik addresses two fundamental
problems involving the ethical propriety of lawyer conduct in mass
tort litigation." The first problem is directly related to the payment of
attorney fees and costs. The concern is that given the enormous
amount of money at stake, lawyers are putting their own financial in-
terests above the interests of their clients; that is, lawyers are receiving
unreasonably large fee awards9 and are being reimbursed for unrea-
representation received by subclasses of claims with different economic values).
6 Prior to being asked to participate in this Symposium, my only foray into the sub-
ject was a paper I wrote on the aggregate settlement rule in mass tort litigation. See
NancyJ. Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Law-
suits, 41 S. Tx. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Moore, The Aggregate Settle-
ment Rule] (prepared for the Spring 1999 South Texas Law Review Symposium on
"Emerging Professional Responsibility Issues in Litigation"). In addition, as Chief Re-
porter to the ABA Commission on the Evaluation of Rules of Professional Conduct
("Ethics 2000 Commission"), I have solicited and considered various proposals to
change the Model Rules in light of developments in mass tort lawsuits, including a
helpful, detailed letter from ProfessorResnik herself. See infra note 46 (suggesting that
regulation of fee arrangements should focus "on which lawyer is actually paid what
amount of money"). Of course, the views expressed in this paper are mine alone and
should not be attributed to the Ethics 2000 Commission.
See, e.g., Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Commenta7y: Contingency Fees in Mass
Torts: Access, Risk and the Provision of Legal Serices When Layers of Lawyers Wok for Indi-
viduals and Collectives of Clients, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 425 (1998); Judith Resnik, From
'Cases' to 'Litigation,' 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991); Judith Resnik et al., Indi-
viduals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296
(1996) [hereinafter Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate].
8 Professor Resnik also discusses the extent to which aggregate litigation presently
offers "subsidies" to litigants to enable them to bring their claims to the attention of
courts. See, e.g., Resnik, Money Matters supra note 1, at 2155 (explaining that "the civil
justice system .... now offers subsidies and incentives to enter [the system], at least for
those whose alleged injuries are widely shared"); id. at 2191 (discussing the possibility
of additional allocation of public resources to subsidize more process for individual
litigants and class members). This article will not respond to the issues raised by this
discussion, as they are primarily procedural and not ethical in nature.
9 Cf. id. at 2172 n.180 (citing cases in which judges limited fees to which attorneys
would have been entitled under fee agreements, on the ground that such contracts
would have "overcompensated" the attorneys).
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sonable costs and expenses.10
The second problem involving attorney conduct does not relate
directly to the payment of fees and costs, but rather reflects concern
for the adequacy of a lawyer's representation in a mass tort lawsuit.
Here, Professor Resnik makes three separate arguments. First, she
notes that lawyers have an interest in obtaining the most money they
can get for the least amount of work and then argues that acting on
this interest sometimes leads plainiffi' lawyers to enter into collusive
settlements with defendants." Second, she worries that lawyers do not
adequately represent the diverse and conflicting interests among dif-
ferent classes of litigants; for example, claimants with strong, high-end
claims may be favored while claimants with weak, low-end claims may
be neglected.12 Third, she argues that there is an unfortunate ten-
10 See id. at 2142 (discussing need to monitor attorneys' submission of requests to be
reimbursed for costs).
" See id. at 2161 (explaining that defendants' and plaintiffs' lawyers are sometimes
placed in the role of "co-venturers"). In this section of her paper, Professor Resnik
discusses the implications of two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases: Amchem Products v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), and Ortiz v. Fbreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295
(1999). In both cases, the Court rejected settlement classes, in part because of con-
cerns that the lawyers for the classes were not adequately representing the members of
the class. See Resnik, Money Matters, supra note 1, at 2167-68. As Professor Resnik
notes, the Court observed in Ortiz that "an 'enormous fee' can 'relax' the 'zeal for the
client.'" Id. For an extended critique of the conduct of class counsel in the case that
gave rise to the Amchem opinion, see Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1048 (1995) (describ-
ing the collusion between class counsel and defendants that occurred in that case).
For a detailed discussion of the dangers of collusion in mass tort lawsuits generally, see,
for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUm. L. REv. 1343 (1995). See also Moore, The Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note
6 (manuscript at 102, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (discussing
problems with class actions, including "faulty incentive mechanisms for class action
lawyers").
This argument is related to but not identical with the first problem mentioned.
Here the concern is not merely that the attorney has been overcompensated for the
amount or value of the legal services performed, but rather that the prospect of ex-
traordinarily high legal fees may cause the lawyer to compromise the lawyer's fiduciary
obligations to the client or clients. See id. (manuscript at 126) (stating that there is a
concern that the lawyer's interest in realizing a potentially enormous legal fee will
cause the lawyer to take unfair advantages of his client).
12 See Resnik, Money Matters, supra note 1, at 2169 (explaining that lawyers might
favor some claims over others). The conflicts between various subgroups within the
class were the primary focus of the Court's concern in Amchem. An additional problem
present in that case was the fact that class counsel was representing not only various
subgroups within the class, but also individual claimants with pending cases outside the
class. See generally Koniak, supra note 11, at 1064 (noting that "CCR and class counsel
settled over 14,000 asbestos cases outside the class framework while they were negotiat-
ing the Georgine class action" (citation omitted)). For a discussion of the nature of the
conflicts of interest between "high-end" and "low-end" claims, see Moore, The Aggregate
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dency among some lawyers to focus exclusively on achieving financial
outcomes, thereby ignoring the needs and desires of litigants to be in-
volved in the litigation process.13
As to the first problem, there is no question that some lawyers
charge or seek excessive fees in mass tort (and other) litigation. 4 Pro-
fessor Resnik does not discuss in detail what makes some fees exces-
sive, so neither will I. Rather, she simply urges judges to actively
monitor lawyer conduct in this area.15
I agree that judges should actively monitor attorney fees and costs.
I do not agree, however, that there is any need for vigorous justifica-
tion of this aspect of a judge's role. In particular, I reject the argu-
ment that judges in aggregated cases function effectively as clients
6
and that it is because they do so that they should actively monitor at-
torney fees and costs.'
7
Settlement Rule, supra note 6, (manuscript at 119) (discussing that "high stakes" plain-
tiffs benefit the least from class actions, while victims whose claims are the smallest or
most questionable benefit most from "damage averaging").
'3 See Resnik, Money Matters, supra note 1, at 2128, 2166-67 (explaining that the need
of clients to engage in the justice system is often ignored due to the focus on economic
outcomes as a measure of litigation success). As Professor Resnik notes, this argument
received extended treatment in her earlier collaborative work. See generally Resnik et
al., Individuals Within the Aggregate, supra note 7, at 381-401 (explaining the role of
courts in providing opportunities for public participation).
14 See, eg., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 768 F. Supp. 912, 922
(D.P.R. 1991) (modifying contingent fee contracts exceeding 25% for minors and in-
competent plaintiffs and 33% for adult clients).
" See Resnik, Money Matters, supra note 1, at 2172 ("Judicial regulation of contrac-
tual fee agreements in tort litigation has already begun to increase." (footnote omit-
ted)).
16 A pervasive theme of Money Matters is thatjudges are serving not only as "fiduciar-
ies" of an aggregate, but also are serving "functionally" as clients. Id. at 2163; see also id.
at 2129 ("My argument is that, in mass torts, judges are the market. Judges now have
the power of payment, serving more like clients and consumers. . . ."); id. at 2162
("Return to the image ofjudges as purchasers and allocators of legal services."). This
theme was even more pronounced in an earlier draft of the article. SeeJudith Resnik,
Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees
and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation 13 (Nov. 11, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
7
Here is where money matters. Who pays whom for the work done on behalf
of the civil justice system that now refuses to accede to multi-party agreements
without assurances of multi-faceted representation?...
Return to the image ofjudges as purchasers and allocators of legal services.
Understand now that the "value" of aggregation accrues not only to the liti-
gants but also to the civil justice system; a system concerned with the process-
ing of a high volume of disputes, eager to accomplish inter-litigant equity, and
desirous of policing inappropriate attorney behavior. In fact, settlements of
aggregates help to vindicate a range of public aspirations for the civil justice
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The ability to determine a fee award in the absence of individual
fee agreementsI8 does not turn judges into fee-paying clients. Indeed,
the law of lawyering has never equated payment of legal fees with cli-
ent status. 9 Moreover, given the perceived need to enhance attorney
loyalty to the litigants themselves-including both individual clients
and members of a class!--I believe it is potentially dangerous to rely
on the metaphor of judge as client or purchaser of legal services in
order to justify judicial activism in valuing the legal services per-
formed.21 Rather, I would prefer to rely on the more traditional role
of a judge in a quantum meruit action, in which judges commonly
award attorney fees in the absence of valid fee agreements, valuing the
benefits conferred by lawyers to their clients.22
system. Therefore, the "value" of such tort aggregates cannot only be meas-
ured by the dollars paid to the litigant cohort but also must take into account
the benefits bestowed on the civil justice system, which becomes able to proc-
ess a group of similarly situated claimants in a fashion that does not under-
mine the legitimacy of courts.
Resnik, Money Matters, supra note 2, at 2162.
18 As Professor Resnik notes, judges derive their power to award fees and costs in
mass tort lawsuits through the common law common fund doctrine, as well as under
specific statutes. See id. at 2139, 2143 n.71; see also Resnik et al., Individuals Within the
Aggregate, supra note 7, at 337 (explaining thatjudges turn to the common fund when
the case does not involve either a class action or a statutory fee shift).
'9 See MODELRULEs OF PROFESsIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.8(f) (1999) (providing that
a lawyer may "accept compensation for representing a clientfrm one other than the cli-
ent" under certain conditions, including obtaining the informed consent of the client
(emphasis added)). For a discussion of the ethical dilemmas associated with so-called
"third-party payment," see generally Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Third-Paty Pay-
ment: Beyond the InsuranceDefense Paradigm, 16 REV. ITIG. 585 (1997).
Judges making fee awards pursuant to either the common law common fund doc-
trine or statutory fee-shifting schemes would not ordinarily be viewed as "third-party
payers." If, however, judges come to view themselves as "purchasers of legal services,"
some of the dangers associated with third-party payment may arise. See infra notes 20-
21 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing concerns raised in
Amchema and Ortiz regarding potential conflicts of interests among various claimants in
class action suits)); see also Moore, The Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 6, at Part
V.B.2 (discussing the incentives arising from the aggregation of large numbers of
claims for lawyers to promote their own financial gain at the expense of their clients).
2" See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 443 (1986) (noting that the
central concern underlying ethical rules regulating third-party payment is that "the
lawyer's loyalty may be influenced by the fee-payer's interests and those may conflict
with the interests of the lawyer's client").
2 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TBE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 51 & cmt. a
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (setting forth "a lawyer's right to recover a fair fee
in quantum meruit for legal services provided to a client when a lawyer and client have
not agreed upon another fee"). Judges also value legal services provided when they
determine whether a particular fee charged by a lawyer is greater than is reasonable
under the circumstances, whether in adjudicating fee disputes between lawyers and
2000] 2213
2214 UN!VERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:2209
Similarly, I see no need for any elaborate justification of ajudge's
ability to regulate even in situations where lawyers have entered into
written fee agreements with individual plaintiffs. If, as in In re Copley
Pharmaceutica4 Inc.,23 a judge reduces the percentage of fees recover-
able under these private agreements, in order to pay for the attorney
fees of class counsel or members of a plaintiffs' steering committee, 24 I
see nothing startling or radical in thatjuicial conduct.
Rather, I would analogize this particular form ofjudicial activism
to the traditional role of a judge who monitors the reasonableness of
attorney fee agreements.2a This monitoring occurs in disciplinary
proceedings (albeit rarely) and more frequently in actions to collect a
fee or void a fee agreement.26 In addition, judges have traditionally
reviewed the reasonableness of certain fee agreements before approv-
ing settlements, for example, in cases involving minors.2
Turning now to the second set of problems-that is, those related
to the fairness of settlement agreements and the adequacy of the law-
yer's representation-I believe Professor Resnik is saying that the way
in which attorney fees and costs are paid in mass tort lawsuits exacer-
bates attorney loyalty problems inherent in both class action and con-
clients or when courts are asked to discipline a lawyer for charging excessive fees. See
id. § 46 cmt. a (explaining the prohibition on unreasonable fees as it applies in various
contexts).
1 F. Supp. 2d 1407 (D. Wyo. 1998).
24 In Copley Pharmaceutical, the court ordered that each private attorney would re-
ceive only one third of his or her bargained-for contingency fee in order to help pro-
vide for class counsel's fee award of 13% of the $150 million common fund created.
The court also reduced each class claimant's award by 13% for class counsel's award
and by a further 2% for payment of expenses. See id. at 1418 (determining attorneys'
fees using the percentage method).
' See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 22, § 46
("A lawyer may not charge a fee larger than is reasonable in the circumstances or that
is prohibited by law.").
2 See id. § 46 cmt. a ("In many jurisdictions, authorities have been reluctant to dis-
cipline lawyers on such grounds. For a variety of reasons, discipline might be withheld
for charging a fee that would nevertheless be set aside as unreasonable in a fee-dispute
proceeding."). For an example ofjudicial regulation in this area, see United States v.
Strawser, 800 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming order requiring a lawyer to return
more than half of his trial fee to U.S. Treasury, which was paying appointed counsel on
appeal from conviction of former client, on the ground that the fee was "exorbitant
and unreasonable"); and Bushman v. State Bar, 522 P.2d 312 (Cal. 1974) (disciplining
lawyer for charging an excessive fee in a child custody case).
2 See WOLFRAM, supra note 21, § 9.8.2, at 523-24 (discussing prohibitions on fees
not approved by court for wards of court and other vulnerable parties).
2 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (introducing Professor Resnik's
concerns regarding inadequate representation in mass tort lawsuits).
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tingency fee litigation. 29 If this is so, then this is clearly a problem that
needs to be addressed.
In addition, however, she may be saying something else that is far
more controversial-thatjudges should be using the payment of fees
and costs as a means of changing the behavior of lawyers in socially
desirable ways. For example, judges should structure fees in a way
that increases the lawyer's attention to the diversity of interests among
litigants or that increases the participation of litigants in the lawsuit.O
I have serious concerns about whether increased judicial activism of
the sort proposed by Professor Resnik is either necessary or desirable.
Indeed, more traditional aspects of ethics and the law of lawyering
have a substantial role to play, at least in the case of lawyers represent-
ing individual clients.
For example, lawyers representing individual clients are already
under an ethical obligation to keep their clients informed of the status
of a matter and to comply with reasonable requests for information.S'
It is unclear why we need additional financial incentives to get lawyers
to do what they are already required to do, 2 even when their role is
In this respect, the problem appears to be that when lawyers represent either
large numbers of individual clients or classes composed of large numbers of members,
neither individual clients nor class members are in a position to monitor the lawyer's
conduct; thus, courts must step in and perform a more active monitoring role. See
Resnik, Money Matters, supra note 1, at 2160-61 (discussing adequacy of settlement
agreements); id. at 2176-77 ("Measures used to value attorneys' work need to be revis-
ited.").
See supra note 17. Thus, when Professor Resnik says that judges should be "pay-
ing for process," what she means is thatjudges should structure payment incentives to
encourage lawyers to perform tasks that are ordinarily not rewarded in the current fee
award regime. Resnik, Money Matters, supra note 1, at Part IV.B (urging courts to struc-




(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
MODEL RUL.Es OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1999).
" Although there are certainly difficulties associated with keeping a large number
of clients informed regarding the status of a case, there are various mechanisms that
lawyers can and do employ to keep their clients reasonably informed. See Moore, The
Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 6, at Part IV.A (discussing the variety of ways attor-
neys are able to communicate with their clients). It may be true that many (perhaps
most) lawyers in mass tort lawsuits do not in fact maintain appropriate relationships
with their clients because of their unwillingness to devote the necessary time and en-
ergy to do so. See id. (manuscript at 112 n.78) (questioning "whether most attorneys
do in fact maintain appropriate relationships in mass cases"). But it is also true that
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somewhat circumscribed by a plaintiffs' steering committee.3 Simi-
larly, lawyers representing individual clients are already under an ob-
ligation to avoid impermissible conflicts among their clients34 Moreo-
ver, under the aggregate settlement rule, lawyers are prohibited from
entering into block or aggregate settlements without first informing
the clients of the existence and nature of all the claims and the par-
"even in simple, bi-polar litigation, it is not uncommon for lawyers to fail to keep their
clients adequately informed." Id. The fact that many lawyers violate their ethical obli-
gations under existing rules is not, in itself, a reason that judges should create special
financial incentives to motivate them to comply with these obligations. Cf iU. (arguing
that the failure of lawyers to comply with their obligations under Rule 1.4 is not a rea-
son to relax the requirement of that rule).
" See Resnik, Money Matters, supra note 1, at 2176 (asserting that it will be "insuffi-
cient [to rely] on self-review by steering committee members or oversight from [other]
lawyers" for several reasons, including the fact that "difficult and costly work is entailed
in digesting accountants' reports of moneys spent by lead lawyers and their staffs").
For example, Professor Resnik cites and critiques the decision in In re Dupont Plaza Ho-
tel Fire Litigation, 111 F.Sd 220, 238 (1st Cir. 1997), in which the court rejected the
complaints of lawyers representing individual clients regarding alleged overspending
by members of the plaintiffs' steering committee, in part because the complaining law-
yers did not monitor costs more closely during earlier phases of the litigation. Accord-
ing to Resnik, "[t]o put such burdens of reconstruction and evaluation [of PSC bills
and expense reports] on lawyers representing individual clients in a mass tort case is to
misperceive both those lawyers' capacities and incentives." Resnik, Money Matters, supra
note 1, at 2175 n.187 (emphasis added). Certainly, such lawyers ought not be required
to do more than is reasonably within their capacities, but the fact that they do not have
sufficientfinancial incentive to do so is irrelevant. If they are continuing to be paid un-
der their contingent fee contracts (even if reduced somewhat to help reimburse the
PSC, see supra note 24 and accompanying text), then they are required to perform
some work to earn their fees, that is, unless they are being paid a pure referral fee,
which is unethical in many jurisdictions. See, eg., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1999) (stating that fee division among lawyers is proper only if
"the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written
agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representa-
tion").
34 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide:
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client...
unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multi-
ple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUC Rule 1.7(b) (1999). For a discussion of the
application of Rule 1.7(b) to the representation of individual clients in mass tort law-
suits, see Moore, The Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 6, (manuscript at 125) (includ-
ing the ethical propriety of a lawyer asking multiple clients to be bound by a majority
or super-majority vote to accept an aggregate settlement offer).
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ticipation of each person in the settlement. 5
Professor Resnik might well respond that it is all well and good
that lawyers have these obligations under current ethical rules, but
that these rules are regularly violated with impunity. This may well be
true, although I think that she gives insufficient attention to the role
played by professional norms in shaping lawyers' conducte In any
event, what she calls a tradition of "laissez-faire lawyering"5 7 has never
depended on an assumption that individual clients could effectively
monitor the performance of their lawyers.ss Indeed, the extent to
The Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct provide:
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in mak-
ing an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients.., unless
each client consents after consultation, including disclosure of the existence
and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of
each person in the settlement.
MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8(g) (1999). For contrasting views
of the pros and cons of this rule in mass tort lawsuits, compare Charles Silver & Lynn
A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 733
(1997) (arguing that the rule should be abolished), with Moore, TheAggregate Settlement
Rule supra note 6 (arguing that the rule should be retained).
See, eg., Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubeck, New Problems and New Paradigms in
Studies of the Legal Profession, in LAwIERS' IDEAlS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 1, 22-23 (Robert
L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992):
The norms, traditions and practices that make up [professionalism] serve a
variety of purposes. They generate the claims that allow lawyers to maintain
jurisdiction over work. They become part of each lawyer's professional iden-
tity, to some extent providing coherence and meaning in everyday life and al-
lowing lawyers to respond to new situations in "appropriate" ways. [Profes-
sionalism] provide [s] a set of dispositions that lawyers use to interpret their
situations and orient their choices according to an internalized world view
which delimits but does not necessarily determine action.
Aside from the pull of professional norms, it is sometimes in a lawyer's self-interest to
comply with professional rules. For example, one mass tort lawyer argues that one way
to enhance the likelihood of plaintiffi agreeing to accept an aggregate settlement offer
is to develop the attorney-client relationship by regularly providing plaintiffs with as
much information as possible about the progress of the lawsuit and affording them
opportunities to consult regularly with members of the lawyer's staff. See Moore, The
Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 6 (manuscript at 116 n.98).
S7 Professor Resnik uses the term "laissez-faire lawyering" throughout the article
and contrasts it with what she calls "regulated advocacy." See Resnik, Money Matters, su-
pra note 1, at Part 1.C. The former refers to a lack ofjudicial intervention, whereas
the latter refers to a "bundle of efforts by the judiciary to direct lawyers to pursue cer-
tain goals," including settlement. Id. at 2142.
38 An example of Professor Resnik's view of the underpinnings of what she calls
"laissez-faire lawyering":
[Uinder current law, judges need make no inquires when dismissing cases or
entering consentjudgments. The unregulated attorney-client unit is a con-
tractually-bound unit. Agency-principal relations are presumed sufficient, in
that the lawyer is imagined to be monitored by the client and the charter for
representation controlled by that client. Consent by the participants to
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which clients are necessarily dependent on the trustworthiness of their
lawyers is whatjustifies the role of the lawyer as a fiduciary' 9 Rather, if
judges do not typically review settlement agreements in individual
cases or otherwise actively monitor attorney-client relationships, it is
because lawyers, as professionals, are expected to adhere to profes-
sional normsi0 Nevertheless, contrary to Professor Resnik's image of
"laissez-faire lawyering," courts have always maintained a significant
oversight role.
In addition to the role that judges play in directly monitoring at-
torney fees and costs,41 there are a number of traditional routes by
which litigants seek redress for attorney misconduct. For example,
violations of conflict of interest rules are sanctionable through legal
malpractice and breach of fiduciary lawsuits.4 Perhaps of even greater
concern to mass tort lawyers today is the recent decision of the Texas
Supreme Court in Burrow v. Arce, in which the court held that lawyers
may be subject to total or partial fee forfeiture as a sanction for serious
agreements therefore avoids the need for adjudicatory processes.
Id. at 2169.
-9 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 22,
ch. 2 introductory note ("A lawyer is a fiduciary agent, to whom clients entrust matters,
property, and information, which may be of great importance and sensitivity, and
whose work is usually not subject to detailed client supervision because of its complex-
ity."); see also Moore, The Aggregate Settlement Rule, supra note 6, at Part V.C.1 (applying
the fiduciary model to argue in favor of retaining the aggregate settlement rule, under
which multiple clients are not permitted to consent, ex ante, to commit themselves to
follow the vote of a majority or super-majority of the clients to accept an aggregate of-
fer of settlement).
40 Indeed, one of the hallmarks of a "profession" is that it is self-regulating. See, e.g.,
ABA COMM. ON PROFEssIONALIsM, ... .. IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERvIcE": A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAwYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986) (approving
sociologist Eliot Freidson's definition of a profession as "[a ] n occupation whose mem-
bers have special privileges, such as exclusive licensing, that are justified by" a number
of assumptions, including "[t]hat the occupation is self-regulating-that is, organized
in such a way as to assure the public and the courts that its members are competent, do
not violate their client's trust, and transcend their own self-interest"). For a discussion
of various theories of the professions, see NancyJ. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered,
1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 773.
41 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional role of
judges monitoring the reasonableness of fee agreements in disciplinary actions, in ad-
judicating fee disputes, and in cases involving minors).
4See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 22,
§ 201 cmt. f (discussing sanctions for violation of lawyer conflict of interest rules, in-
cluding discipline, malpractice and fee forfeiture); see also id. § 72 (Tentative Draft No.
8, 1997) (noting that for purposes of civil liability, the lawyer owes the client a duty to
fulfill fiduciary duties to the client). For a discussion of the extent to which malprac-
tice and breach of fiduciary lawsuits are increasingly important in the regulation of
lawyers' conflict of interest duties, see NancyJ. Moore, Restating the Law of Lauyer Con-
fiots, 10 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 541-44 (1997).
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violations of an ethical rule.? Burrow involved allegations that mass
tort lawyers breached their fiduciary duties to their clients by violating
the aggregate settlement rule.?
Perhaps legal ethics can and should do more to ameliorate what
Professor Resnik sees as serious lapses in lawyers' ethical conduct in
mass tort lawsuits. I doubt, however, that much can be done by way of
amending rules of professional conduct. For example, fee agree-
ments that structure the "layers of lawyers"5 in aggregate litigation
are already governed by Rule 1.5.4' In addition, Rule 1.5 requires that
43 997 S.W.2d 229, 246 (Tex. 1999).
4Burrow involved a plant explosion in which most of the victims were represented
by a single law firm with 126 clients. See Peter Passell, Challenge to Multimillion-Dollar
Settlement Threatens Top Texas Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6. In their subse-
quent lawsuit against the law firm, the claimants alleged that the lawyers did not de-
velop or evaluate their claims individually, but rather reached an aggregate settlement
without prior authority, at which time they "summoned" the claimants for a 20-minute
meeting to discuss the settlement. SeeArce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tex. App.
1997), rev'd, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999) (presenting the facts underlying the claim-
ant's lawsuit); see also RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LATYERS, supra
note 22, § 49 (discussing when fee forfeiture may be appropriate).
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
4Professor Resnik is concerned that the fee arrangements among these lawyers
may impair the structural integrity of a settlement agreement because they may weaken
an attorney's loyalty to a subgroup of clients or class members. See Resnik, Money Mat-
ters, supra note 1, at 2186-87 & n.218 (discussing how loyalty to clients may be affected
by such things as referral fees); see also Letter from Judith Resnik, Professor, Yale Law
School, to Nancy J. Moore, Professor, Boston University School of Law 2 (July 19,
1999) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter Resnik Let-
ter]:
The issue of who is to be compensated turns on what fee arrangements exist
among the layers of lawyers participating in any given litigation. As you know,
many courts have not insisted on learning the financial arrangements but
have simply given a kind of "block grant" to a firm or a particular lawyer, who
may then redivide it. If regulation is to be effective, it has to be focused on
which lawyer is actually paid what amount of money. Howeverjudicial incen-
tives to regulate are thinned by judicial dependence on lawyers within aggre-
gates to agree to settlements.
47
Rule 1.5:
(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be
made only if.
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer
or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint re-
sponsibility for the representation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all
the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (e) (1999).
Professor Resnik notes the existence of this rule and argues that its enforcement
requires judges to "inquire into the financing of the litigation and the organizational
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all fees be "reasonable." 48 It might help to clarify that one of the fac-
tors that determines whether a contingent fee is reasonable is the de-
gree of risk to the lawyer taking the case,4 but whether particular fee
arrangements are proper may be best left to courts to decide on an
individual basis. 4 Similarly, although litigation costs and expenses
should also be "reasonable,"5' it is doubtful that ethics codes can
structure of the lawyering units to learn whether subclass lawyers... have reasons to be
loyal to a subgroup of clients and the degree to which their own fiscal and professional
well-being turns on being a team player within a lawyer cohort." Resnik, Money Matters,
supra note 1, at 2187. Rule 1.5(e), however, may not apply to lawyers representing a
class, i.e., a lawyer with no individual clients. Cf infra note 58 and accompanying text
(stating that although the lawyer owes a fiduciary duty to each member of the class,
unnamed members of class are not clients of the class lawyer). For a discussion of the
extent to which the Rules of Professional Conduct might be amended to directly ad-
dress class representation, see infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
48
Rule 1.5
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in de-
termining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service prop-
erly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer,
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers per-
forming the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.5 (a) (1999).
4 The Ethics 2000 Commission has tentatively proposed amending Rule 1.5(a) (8)
so that a court or disciplinary agency would consider not merely "whether the fee is
fixed or contingent," as provided by current Rule 1.5(a) (8), but rather "the degree of
risk assumed by the lawyer when the fee is fixed or contingent on the outcome of the
matter." ABA Ethics 2000 Comm'n on the Evaluation of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct,
Proposed Rule 1.5, Public Discussion Draft (Nov. 15, 1999) Rule 1.5(a) (8), available at
<http://www.abanetorg/cpr/rule15drafthtml>.
so Professor Resnik suggests that lawyer codes might be amended to provide for bet-
ter timing of "lawyer payouts" in various forms of aggregated litigation, i.e., that "fee
distributions should occur periodically but final payments should not be made until all
aspects of the claims process (including the provision of auxiliary services that some-
times is a part of large scale remedies) have been completed." Resnik Letter, supra
note 46, at 2; see also Resnik, Money Matters, supra note 1, at 2181 n.204 (suggesting pe-
riodic payment of lawyer fees to ensure legal assistance until all claimants have re-
ceived benefits). This type of regulation appears better suited for courts overseeing
particular litigation than for codification in disciplinary rules.
"' Cf Resnik, Money Matters, supra note 1, at 2175-77 (noting the need to monitor
costs and expenses of lead counsel).
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themselves specify what charges are appropriate in particular cases.5 2
There is, of course, a substantial gap in the lawyer codes, and that
is the failure to address the ethical dilemmas of class action lawyers.
53
The ABA has been urged repeatedly to fill this gap, but unfortunately,
it has been difficult to identify specific standards that would be useful
in this complex and evolving area of the law. Professor Resnik has
suggested that codes should clarify who is the "client" to whom the
lawyer is ethically obligeds but there simply is no easy answer to this
difficult question.56 In any event, the unnamed members most at risk
52 Professor Resnik suggests that the codes might address "the forms of expenses
permitted to be charged." Resnik Letter, supra note 46, at 2; cf. Resnik, Money Matters,
supra note 1, at 2177 n.191 (referring to "formulas for the recoupment of costs",such
as guidelines for government employees). As Professor Resnik herself recognizes,
however, identifying the sorts of "costs" that are appropriately charged in litigation is a
complex question that may depend on the nature of the litigation, for example,
whether the fee is contingent or hourly. Id. at 2174 n.184 (discussing different systems
employed by contingent fee and hourly wage lawyers). At present, lawyers are ex-
pected to discuss with their clients at the outset of the representation not only how the
fee will be determined, but also the lawyer's method of billing and what items will be
charged as costs. See id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 9 3-379 (1993), which notes that all attorneys are expected to specify billing
methods and costs in advance); see also ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5(b) (Proposed Rule 1.5 Public Discussion Draft Nov. 15,
1999) (requiring a lawyer to communicate the basis for both the legal fee and costs, in
writing, at the outset of the representation).
53 See, e.g., BrianJ. Waid, Ethical Problems of the Class Action Practitioner:. Continued Ne-
glect by the Drafters of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 Loy. L. REV. 1047,
1048-49 (1981) (noting that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide little ethical guidance to the class action practitio-
ner).
54 For example, one commentator who decries the ABA rule drafters' "continuing
neglect" of the ethical problems of class action lawyers, offers a rule proposal of such
generality that it would provide virtually no guidance to practitioners:
Rule 3.10 Responsibility of Class Counsel
The lawyer representing a class of individuals in a class action owes a pri-
mary duty of loyalty to members of the class defined by the original pleadings
filed on behalf of the class, until such definition is amended by leave of court.
Id. at 1075 (suggesting that the rule could "provide a foundation for development of a
coherent body of ethical opinions and comments to guide counsel involved in class
actions").
*" See Resnik Letter, supra note 46, at 2 (suggesting that lawyers should identify cli-
ents to whom they are ethically obliged when considering aggregate settlements).
w See, e.g., RESTATEIE NT (THIMD) OF T-E LAW GOVERNING LANYERS, supra note 22,
§ 26 cmt. f ("Class actions may pose difficult questions of client identification."); see also
HERBERT B. NMVBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15.02-.03 (3d ed.
1992) (discussing risks to absent class members and protection of such members);
Note, Developments in the Law--Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1247, 1447-57 (1981) (noting that the code's premise of a unitary client is undermined
by the number of individuals considered to be the "client"). Client identification is
also problematic in a number of other different areas. As a result, lawyer codes typi-
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are almost certainly not clients in the normal sense,5 7 although a class
lawyer owes fiduciary duties to each member of the class.M Even here,
the extent of the duty owed may differ according to the setting 9 In
the final analysis, the code format may be insufficiently flexible to
adequately communicate the duties of class action counsel. Given
that the resolution of ethical issues often depends on the principles
set forth in other law, it may be preferable to continue to look to
courts to provide further guidance,' ° either by promulgating addi-
tional procedural rules or by addressing the ethical obligations of class
lawyers while ruling on various procedural aspects of class action liti-
gation.6
1
From my point of view, the significance of Professor Resnik's pa-
per is that it appears to be the first scholarly examination that I know
of (other than that contained in her prior work) that addresses the
ethical problems associated with attorneys fees and costs in mass tort
litigation, particularly those arising from the intricate "layers of law-
yers" in many of these cases.62 Until recently, legal ethics professorshave effectively ignored the practices of lawyers in mass tort cases, par-
cally leave it to "principles of substantive law external to [the codes to] determine
whether a client-lawyer relationship exists." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Preamble, Scope, & Terminology para. 15 (1999).
-1 See, e.g., Note, supra note 56, at 1453 (stating that neither the named representa-
tives nor the absent class members control the lawyers' actions). But see NEWBERG &
CONTE, supra note 56, § 1503 (describing a perspective in which the relationship be-
tween class counsel and absent class members is viewed as a "constructive attorney-
client relationship" in order to analyze issues like solicitation and communication).
' See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 22,
§ 26 cmt. f ("Lawyers in class actions thus have duties to the class as well as to the class
representatives.").
59 For example, the lawyer's duties may differ depending on whether the class has
been certified. See, eg., Waid, supra note 53, at 1063-64 (discussing differences in du-
ties based on certification, such as the ability to negotiate settlements).
6 See WOLFRAM, supra note 21, at 493 ("[T]he matter has been left, correctly, to
regulation through the closejudicial supervision that ideally attends class actions.").
61 In saying so, I do not mean to point back toward the type of procedural reforms
that Professor Resnik suggests when she urges judges to use their power to award at-
torneys fees and costs as a means of forcing lawyers to comply with their ethical duties.
Rather, I have in mind either the promulgation of additional rules of civil procedure
or the adoption ofjudicial opinions that clearly state the obligations of lawyers in class
actions such as obligations that must be satisfied in order for a class to be certified or a
settlement approved. In the course of such opinions, judges may also expand on the
ethical duties of lawyers, e.g., stating the circumstances under which lawyers are enti-
tled to be reimbursed for the costs and expenses of litigation. Such precedentwill cre-
ate guidance that is helpful to lawyers, even though it is not expressly codified in the
rules of professional conduct.
'2 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing multiple roles played by
plaintiffs' lawyers in class actions).
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ticularly those concerning the lawyer's role in consolidated individual
actions.6 Although these issues are sufficiently complex that they are
unlikely to be resolved by amendments to codes of professional ethics,
they are certainly deserving of more extensive scholarly treatment by
legal ethics professors. I congratulate Professor Resnik for recogniz-
ing and bringing these questions to the surface, and I hope that we
ethicists will accept the challenge to assist her and other procedural-
ists in searching for the answers to these and other ethical dilemmas
of mass tort lawyers.
See Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role ofPlaintiffs' Counsel in
AllocatingSettlement Proceeds, 84VA. L. REV. 1465, 1474-75 (1998) ("[C]ase law concern-
ing counsel's permitted role in consensual group lawsuits, as in class actions, is am-
biguous and immature."); Silver & Baker, supra note 35, at 736 ("[S] cholarly examina-
tion of the aggregate settlement rule and the practices to which it relates is long
overdue."). For other examples of recent attention by legal ethics scholars to issues
raised by mass tort lawsuits, see The 1998 Mass Tort Symposium Legal Ethical Issues at the
Cutting Edge of Substantive and Procedural Law, 17 REV. ITIG. 419 (1998); Symposium,
Mass Tortes: Seing UpJust Desserts, 80 CORNELLL. REV. 811 (1995).
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